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INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the main intellectual property consequences of practicing law and whether attorneys can prevent others from using their work-product. The article does not assume that the reader is an expert in intellectual property law; instead, it is designed to answer the types of questions practitioners have about their rights.
There is one primary legal code that impacts attorneys' rights to their work-product: the copyright law.
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1 EDWARD PARRY, MY OWN WAY 40 (1932) . 2 The current copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976, is found in Title 17 of the U.S. Code.
There is increasing controversy about whether another intellectual property law system will become important to the practice of law -the patent law. See Gary C. Bubb It is unclear if this type of patent will survive legal challenges to the appropriateness of the patent. In In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), a patent was claimed on a method of imposing mandatory arbitration statement, copyright law protects how an author expresses ideas. 3 It is the system that is used to prevent others from copying a book, a movie, a musical composition, or even a computer program. 4 It is almost exclusively a federal statutory remedy as comparable state protections have been preempted. 5 As much of what an attorney does is expressing ideas in writing, the copyright system is the most important method of protecting an attorney's work-product.
To clarify the discussion of copyright law and how it applies to legal drafting, three hypotheticals will be used. In each of these cases, the drafting attorneys may feel that their rights have been or will be impinged.
within a legal document such as a contract. See id. at 1368. The claims were ultimately rejected by the PTO as being obvious. See id. at 1370-71. When this determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the denial of the patent, but on grounds that call many legal practice patents into question. See id. at 1371. The Court ultimately held that
[i]t is thus clear that the present statute does not allow patents to be issued on particular business systems -such as a particular type of arbitration -that depend entirely on the use of mental processes. In other words, the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter. Thus, it is established that the application of human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of itself patentable.
Id. at 1378-79. Under this standard, it is highly doubtful that the '790 patent would be sustained if challenged in court. 3 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) . 4 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) . 5 See id. § 301(a).
I. HYPOTHETICALS
A. The Brenda Maxim HypotheticalLitigation Work-Products
Brenda Maxim is a brilliant trial attorney in private practice. One of her cases, the Applejack case, presented an issue of whether the Rule Against Perpetuities was preempted by ERISA. She drafted and filed a memorandum of law 6 that succinctly defined both areas of law and argued that such preemption did not occur. The judge was persuaded by the memorandum and ruled in favor of Brenda's client Applejack following the reasoning Brenda had presented; indeed, the judge freely quoted from Brenda's memorandum without attributing the quotes to her. Several months later, as Brenda was reading the week's case summaries, she saw a synopsis of a litigation in another circuit that was based on the same law that had been decided in Applejack. Out of curiosity, she went online using her legal research service to read the new opinion. One of the options she was presented with was to read the brief that had been submitted to the court in the new case. She chose this option and found that the brief had quoted most of the one she had submitted in Applejack without attribution to her and certainly without her permission. When she then looked up the Applejack case she found that her brief had been loaded into the research system, again without her consent. 6 The choice of a memorandum of law for this hypothetical is intentional as it is generally seen as among the most creative of the litigation documents an attorney prepares. 
II. HOW COPYRIGHT LAW WORKS
Copyright law is a system that protects the expression contained within an author's work without protecting the underlying ideas and concepts that were expressed. 8 Distinguishing between the two, the protectable expression from the unprotectable idea, is not easy. As Learned Hand stated in the leading precedent on the difference:
Upon any work, . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his 'ideas', to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. In some cases the question has been treated as though it were analogous to lifting a portion out of the copyrighted work; but the analogy is not a good one, because, though the skeleton is a part of the body, it pervades and supports the whole. In such cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression and what is expressed. digital recorder, it is fixed when the analog signals are magnetically recorded by the tape recorder or when the digital equivalents are stored in the memory of the digital recorder. 15 The legal pad fixes the work when the ink binds with the paper substrate. 16 For all of these methods, the expression made can be observed again which establishes fixation.
In contrast, if the attorneys merely thought of the words or spoke them without recording them, no fixation would have occurred. When words are thought or spoken, they disappear and cannot be recaptured. 17 The copyright act requires that the words that constitute the work be "perceiv [ 18 for fixation to have occurred. As words that are just spoken or just conceived cannot be, fixation has not occurred.
Consequently, most of the work-product of an attorney is fixed and has cleared the first hurdle towards copyrightability. Certainly, the memorandum, contract, and other documents in the three presented hypotheticals have been fixed.
B. Is an Attorney's Work-Product a "Work of
Authorship?"
For a copyright to subsist, the creation must be a "work of authorship." Although Congress did not define "work of authorship" in the Copyright Act, the legislative history Cir. 1982 be original to the author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might be. 20 Thus, a work that is created by its author rather than copied and one that has some creativity within it 21 will be copyrighted as soon as it is fixed. When examined under these requirements, much, although not all, of the work-product of an attorney will qualify for copyright. A detailed consideration of the two requirements will differentiate between works that are protectable and those that are not.
Do Work-Product Documents
Originate from the Attorney?
This requisite is typically satisfied when most documents are created by an attorney. When the hypothetical attorneys being discussed in this article created the documents, they presumably decided on what words would best express the concepts with which they were working. Whether through keyboarding, dictation or longhand, these words were fixed as required by the Copyright Act. Although nothing more than this is required to satisfy this first requisite for copyrightability, some further analytical examination is necessary as some parts of the legal document may have been copied from another work.
When Brenda wrote her brief in the Applejack case, for instance, it is probable that she extracted some parts of it from other attorneys or commercially available form books.
23
It is very typical, after all, for the pro forma sections of a brief to be reused in all of an attorney's briefs. 24 The original author of these sections may not be the primary author of the brief which would disallow any copyright claim 25 24 When a brief supporting the grant of summary judgment is drafted, for example, the section of the brief that sets forth the standards used by the court in evaluating whether the case is appropriate for summary judgment is rarely custom-drafted; instead, the appropriate paragraphs are used out of the attorney's or a commercially available form bank. 25 The only possible claim would be as a "collective work," see 17 Vol. 3 the brief author wrote the pro forma sections, the copyright would be limited to a copyright in a derivative work which is limited to any newly added material that contains sufficient creativity to be considered original.
26
This analysis is likely to be more limiting to David's ability to claim a copyright in his contract. Unlike briefs, contracts have more provisions that do not differ significantly from those found in any form book. 27 Much of a contract, after all, is comprised of stock clauses 28 that do not differ from contract to contract. Consequently, these prototype sections of a contract rarely owe their origin to the drafting attorney and would not be protected by a copyright. 29 For the sections of the contract that are not drafted using the legal cookie cutter, on the other hand, and are custom drafted for the particular contract in question, this first requisite is satisfied.
U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "collective work"), although that type of work is intended to be associated with such things as periodicals. As a practical matter, however, the courts are unlikely to see the brief as a compilation as there were no significant modifications made to the pro forma sections of the brief. As a compilation, it is only the selection and arrangement of the preexisting material that is protected. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.02. As the content and order of these pro forma sections is always the same -a brief for summary judgment will set forth the standards for granting the motion first, if the standards are addressed at all -there is insufficient creativity to support the compilation copyright. 
Do Work-Product Documents
Contain Sufficient Creativity?
Unfortunately, determining whether a work has sufficient creativity to be copyrighted is not simple as the circuits have two different standards for how exceptional a work must be before a copyright subsists. 30 In Feist, the Supreme Court described the needed amount of creativity as "minimal" and stressed that novelty was not required. 31 Most circuits, 32 the Second being a good example, seem to have focused on the word "minimal" and have not imposed strict standards for creativity. 33 Other circuits, 34 with the Ninth being the leading proponent, have ignored this warning and imposed potentially onerous requirements before creativity will be found. 35 Consequently, to determine if a work-product of an attorney is protected, the alternate circuit standards must be evaluated-the majority minimalist standard and the minority high novelty standard. Vol. 3 (a) The Creativity Required in a Minimalist Jurisdiction
Most circuits have recognized how little creativity is needed to meet the Feist requirement. For example, the Second Circuit held that:
Originality does not mean that the work for which copyright protection is sought must be either novel or unique, it simply means a work independently created by its author, one not copied from pre-existing works, and a work that comes from the exercise of the creative powers of the author's mind, in other words, the fruits of the author's intellectual labor.
36
As the court applied this definition of originality, its focus was on the intellectual choice-making in which the author engaged. 37 For example, when the Boisson court examined the layout of the letters on the alphabet quilt design in question in the case, it determined that there was sufficient creativity in their layout because there was a wide range of possible layouts that could be used, only one of which was chosen by the author. 38 As the court stated, "an author is entitled to copyright protection for an independently produced original work despite its identical nature to a prior work, because it is independent creation, and not novelty that is required."
39
Under this standard of creativity, most of the workproduct produced by the hypothetical attorneys would be sufficiently creative for copyright protection to be available. There are obviously many words that can be chosen to express most legal concepts. By selecting from the choices, 36 sufficient creativity for copyright protection is found. 40 The only expressions excluded in these jurisdictions would be those copied from another, pre-existing source 41 or one where the author had no choices. Unfortunately, there is a minority of circuits that impose a significantly higher hurdle before they will find sufficient creativity. 43 The Ninth Circuit in Satava v. Lowry, 44 for example, demanded a great deal of novelty before a work will qualify for a copyright. 45 In Satava, the court examined the copyrightability of a glass jellyfish sculpture. 46 Despite the holding in Feist that novelty was not required, 47 45 See id. at 810 (9th Cir. 2003) ("expressions that are standard, stock, or common to a particular subject matter or medium are not protectable under copyright law."). Cf. id. at 812 ("These elements are so commonplace in glass-in-glass sculpture and so typical of jellyfish physiology that to recognize copyright protection in their combination effectively would give Satava a monopoly on lifelike glass-in-glass sculptures of single jellyfish with vertical tentacles."). 46 See id. at 807. 47 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 ("Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying."). 48 See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810 (copyright was rejected as sculpture was made of "standard, stock, or common" elements).
If novelty rather than expressive choice is required, significantly less of an attorney's work-product will be protected by copyright. In Brenda's brief, for example, a court would likely find that large sections of it are comprised of "expressions that are standard, stock or common to a particular subject matter."
49 As before, the pro forma sections on the standards for granting summary judgment would likely be unprotectable, 50 but unlike in minimalist circuits, significantly more may be excluded from copyright protection. In the discussion on the Rule Against Perpetuities or ERISA in Brenda's brief, much of what Brenda said would be "common to [those] subject matter [s] ."
51 As a consequence, no protection would be available. This impact is even more likely to affect the protection available to David's contract as contracts are even more limited in the expression of their subject matter than briefs are.
(c) Where You Bring Suit Controls
The inescapable conclusion of the analysis is that where you are (or, more accurately, where a suit for copyright infringement is commenced) 52 is going to control what rights you have. In the high novelty circuits such as the Ninth, much of what an attorney produces is likely to be found creatively wanting and thus unprotectable. In most other circuits, the opposite result is likely. Until the Supreme Court decides to resolve the circuit split, 53 an attorney whose work is 49 
Id. (emphasis added
III. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND USE
The Copyright Act vests ownership of a copyright in a work in the person or people who are the authors of it.
55 "As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection." 56 Applying this rule to the practice of law establishes that the attorney is presumptively the author and will be recognized as the owner of the resulting copyright. 57 There are three things that could alter this conclusion, however. First, in appropriate circumstances, the person who pays for a work to be produced may be considered the author under the "work-made-for-hire" provision of the Copyright Act. 58 Second, for some works, someone in addition to the attorney may be able to claim ownership as a "joint work" under the statute. 59 Finally, the Code of Professional Conduct must be evaluated to determine if the rules of practice dictate a different answer. 60 Each of these areas will be addressed in turn.
A. Are Work-Product Documents "Works
Made for Hire" under the Copyright Act?
Although normally the person who fixes an expression is its author under the Copyright Act, this rule is changed for a "work made for hire."
61 A work will be one made for hire if either:
(1)
[the] work [is] prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2)
[the] work [is] specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
62
As a practical matter, attorney-prepared documents would have to qualify as having been created pursuant to employment as the second test-a specially ordered or commissioned work -does not often apply to the work of an attorney. Congress specified a list of nine categories of works 59 See id. § 201(a) (establishing a co-ownership for jointly produced works) & id. § 101 (defining "joint work"). 60 See that could be specially ordered or commissioned as a work made for hire: (1) collective works, (2) parts of audiovisual works, (3) translations, (4) supplementary works, (5) compilations, (6) instructional texts, (7) tests, (8) answers to tests, or (9) atlases. 63 A work fixed by a non-employee that is not in these nine categories cannot be a work made for hire.
64
Most of these statutory examples-specifically number two, three, six, seven, eight and nine-do not describe the kinds of materials attorneys normally create. Consequently, if the specially ordered or commissioned category is to apply, the work must be a collective work, a supplementary work or a compilation.
Very few works of lawyers qualify as a "collective work" which requires that "a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 65 The illustrative examples given in the definition are "periodical issue[s], antholog[ies and] encyclopedia [s] ."
66 In distinction, a lawyer's work-product is a unified whole; indeed, even where multiple attorneys work on the same product, the individual contributions rarely stand on their own as articles in a magazine do. Once the work is done, a single work exists, not a collection of smaller pieces.
Similarly the definition Congress provided for a supplementary work (found within the definition of a work made for hire) indicates that it must be a "secondary adjunct" to another author's work such as a forward. 67 This does not describe a contract, brief, or other typical work-product.
Finally, a work-product is not usually a compilation as that requires the "assembl[y] of preexisting materials . . ." 68 Although there might be some pre-existing material contained within a work-product, most of the typical work- 63 Id. § 101 (2000) (defining "work made for hire"). 64 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (acknowledging that a sculpture could not be a specially ordered or commissioned work as it was not one of the nine categories).
65 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining collective work). 66 Id. 67 Id. (defining "supplementary work" within the definition of "work made for hire"). 68 Id. (defining "compilation"). Vol. 3 product is created specifically for the matter at hand. An exception to this would be a fill-in-the-blank type of form contract or other document where no drafting is done. If all the attorney does is to fill in the name, it could be a compilation under the statute. In this case, however, the other requirement of the statute for a specially ordered or commissioned work-that "the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire" 69 -is rarely satisfied. Although many attorneys use written retainer agreements, they are unlikely to address the copyright ownership issue in a way that would vest ownership in the client. 70 Consequently, for an attorney's work-product to belong to anyone other than the attorney, it will have to qualify as one produced during employment. To do this, the work had to be prepared by an employee as that term is understood under the common law. 71 The Court expressly held that this determination is one of federal rather than state common law. 72 In defining an employee, the Court relied heavily on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY. 73 The RESTATEMENT lists eight criteria that need to be evaluated to determine if someone is an employee (in a master-servant relationship under the RESTATEMENT): 69 Id. (defining "work made for hire"). 70 It is also important for a fill-in-the-blank document to evaluate whether there is sufficient creativity contained for it to be an original work of authorship at all. See infra § II.B.2. 71 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740-41 (1989) . 72 See id. at 740 ("Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given the Act's express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by broadly preempting state statutory and common-law copyright regulation."). 73 See id. at 740, 751-52 and nn.18-31. It is unclear if the Court would similarly rely on the Third Restatement as its definition of an employee is much less specific. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006). This imprecision is somewhat ameliorated by the comments to the section. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07, cmt. f. The comments in the Third Restatement seem to set forth a similar set of considerations as were found in the section in the Second.
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 74 While some attorneys can satisfy these criteria in relation to their client-in-house corporate counsel, for example-it is clear that most do not. 75 It is the attorney, not the client, that controls the details of the work. 76 Attorneys are clearly 74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) . 75 The analysis here is of the relationship between the individual attorney and the client. Many attorneys who are in private practice are employees of their law firms. If this is true, the law firm would most likely be the owner of the copyright in the work-product rather than the individual attorney. 76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2)(a to accomplish the client's task. The next three factors also disfavor the private practice attorney being an employee as the work will most typically be done at the attorney's office 80 and the relationship and payment will most typically be taskoriented rather than salary 81 (without an expectation that the attorney will be an employee of the client 82 ). Generally, an attorney's clients are not also lawyers. 83 The final factorwhether the client is in business 84 -is the only one that is often true as many attorneys do represent businesses rather than individuals. It would seem unlikely that this factor, alone, is sufficient to alter the conclusion that attorneys are not, in general, employees of their clients. Consequently, the client cannot claim that the copyright belongs to the client under the work made for hire provision of the copyright act.
The consequence of this conclusion can be seen in the Smith hypothetical. Even if Onetime gave Howard the contract that had been drafted by David, that did not allow Howard to reuse it as it is David, not Onetime, that owns the copyright. The right to reproduce the contract, or make modifications to it, belongs to David.
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B. Are Work-Product Documents Joint Works
Under the Copyright Act?
The Copyright Act recognizes that more that one person can collaborate to create an expressive work-a "joint work" to technical, legal and tactical matters."). 77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2)(b). 78 See id. § 220(2)(c). 79 See id. § 220(2)(d). 80 See id. § 220(2)(e). 81 See id. § § 220(2)(f) & 220(2)(g). 82 See id. § 220(2)(i). 83 Cf. § 220(2)(h). 84 See id. § 220(2)(j). under the statute. 86 Such works belong equally to both authors and either can control its use. 87 As a claim could be made that the client and the attorney are joint authors of the attorney's work-product, 88 the standards for being a coauthor must be examined. These standards are not insignificant, however, and lead to the conclusion that work-products are not often the result of joint authorship. For a work to be a joint work under the Copyright Act, two requisites must be met: the purported joint authors must be authors under the copyright act and they must each intend to work together to prepare a joint work. 89 As discussed in section III.B above, to be an author, one has to fix a work of sufficient creativity to constitute a work of authorship. In the case of a joint work, each of the collaborators must do this.
90 This is rarely true for an attorney's work-product as the one who does the "fixing"-and almost all of the creation of the expression-is the lawyer. At most, the client may contribute some or all of the ideas that underlie the document or may offer editing suggestions. Neither is sufficient to make the client an author. 91 In the hypotheticals, it is unlikely that any of the clients participated in any meaningful way with their respective attorneys to produce the documents. 86 See id. § 101 ("A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."). 87 See id. § 201(a) ("The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work."). See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Each author as co-owner has the right to use or to license the use of the work, subject to an accounting to the other co-owners for any profits."). 88 The author could not find a reported case where such a claim was made. 91 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that an actress's contribution of the research that was used to write a play and her suggestions about incidentals associated with the play were insufficient to make her a coauthor).
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Similarly, it is unlikely that the necessary intent was present. For a joint work, all of the joint authors must individually intend to produce a joint work. 92 In the hypotheticals, such mutual intent seems to be lacking. Consequently, a work-product does not constitute a joint work.
C. Do the Ethics of Practice Dictate Who Owns the Work-Product or How It Can Be Used?
Anyone who practices law knows that a primary consideration in all decision-making is the dictates of the rules of practice.
93 These rules-or more accurately, the version of them adopted in the jurisdiction in which the attorney is practicing 94 -establish the framework of the attorney's obligation to his or her client and society. Not surprisingly, the MODEL RULES address the issue of the rights to a work-product, but fail to provide any clear guidance about who owns the work-product of an attorney. The relevant rule as proposed by the ABA states: "Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as . . . surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled . . . The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law." 95 The Copyright Act vests initial ownership of the copyright in the author. 97 As discussed above, unless the lawyer is a common law employee of the client, this means that lawyer is the initial copyright owner. Consequently, absent an express written agreement to the contrary, 98 the client does not own the copyright and cannot, therefore, use ownership as the basis for a claim of entitlement under the rules of practice. Further, the rules of practice of a state cannot alter this rule and establish that the client owns the copyright because of the limitation on the involuntary transfer of a copyright that is contained within the Act:
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, 96 The Copyright Act expressly distinguishes between the "copyright" and a "copy." See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). The copyright is associated with the rights established by the Act to do such things as reproduce the work while the copy is associated with a physical, material object on which the work is recorded. The limitation against a state mandated transfer of the copyright does not apply, however, if all that it seeks to transfer is a nonexclusive right to use the copyrighted work as 99 Id. § 201(e). The reference to title 11 is a reference to a Bankruptcy Court's power to seize a copyright as an asset of a bankrupt. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
Even without this limitation expressed in the Act, it is highly unlikely that state adopted rules of practice could designate the client as the owner of the copyright in an attorney's work-product as such a rule would likely be preempted under the Bonito Boats, Inc. v Section 201(e) only applies to transfers of ownership. 101 The definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" in Section 101 of the act expressly excludes "a nonexclusive license." 102 Because nonexclusive rights to use a copyrighted work are not transfers under the Act, involuntary transfers of nonexclusive rights can be mandated; indeed, copyright law has developed a judicial doctrine known as an implied license that does exactly that.
The implied license doctrine has been expressly accepted in most circuits. 103 As the rule has been set forth by the Seventh Circuit:
an implied nonexclusive license has been granted when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work. 104 The three requirements of this rule are probably met by an attorney's work-product-it is developed for the client, 105 is copied and distributed either to or on behalf of the client, prohibited the client from doing so. 111 Although no reported case could be found that so held, a similar implied license to continue using an attorney's work-product as that work was originally intended would be a probable conclusion were the matter to be litigated. It is fair to assume, therefore, that once the document has been produced, the client has the right to use it. Consequently, in the apropos Henry King hypothetical, any document Henry completed must be made available to Welbuilt so that it can use it as the parties originally intended. This would be true even if Henry has not been fully compensated as Welbuilt's nonexclusive license to use the documents will not be abrogated for non-payment as that is not generally seen as terminating the license.
(b) Modifying or Reusing the Work-Product
If the work-product is used exactly as intended and is not modified by either the client or the client's replacement counsel, the implied license doctrine would almost certainly prevent the use from being considered infringing. The situation becomes much more complicated, however, if the original work is modified (which would include completing a draft document) or if it is used in a way that is different than what was originally intended.
In Oddo v. Ries, 113 for example, an author was deemed to have created an implied license when he submitted an article to a partnership he had formed with the defendant for ultimate publication as part of a book. 114 Subsequently, being dissatisfied with the plaintiff Oddo's efforts, the defendant Ries hired another writer who finished the book which included modifying the material that Oddo had submitted.
115
Ries then published the book. 116 The court held that this was 111 117 In other words, the implied license gave the right to use the work as submitted, but did not allow changes to be made to the submitted work.
If the Oddo rule could simply be applied to the use of an attorney's work-product, the analysis would not be difficultno changes can be made. For example, if the original attorney wrote a memorandum in support of summary judgment, under Oddo, it would be improper for a later counsel to modify the memorandum into a memorandum addressing judgment as a matter of law and would certainly be improper to use it to develop an appellate brief. Similarly, if the attorney drafts a contract for one agreement, it would be improper for the client to modify it for another. Unfortunately, things in copyright law are rarely that simple.
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To begin with, complexity is introduced by the problem of determining what the actual terms of the nonexclusive license are as the typical attorney and client will not have expressed any agreement concerning each party's respective intellectual property rights.
119 From the perspective of the copyright law, a licensee (client) only obtains the specific copyright rights that the licensor (attorney) intended to transfer. 120 Where no intent is expressed-in words or in conduct-no rights transfer, effectively requiring implied licenses to be narrowly construed. From the perspective of the rules of practice, however, the licensor (attorney) is under 117 Id. at 634. 118 In addition to the complexity suggested by the implied terms to the nonexclusive license being discussed in this section, the consequences of the fair use defense, discussed in section IV below, must also be evaluated.
119 Most times, the nonexclusive rights are created by implication based on the parties' conduct rather than on their words. See Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v an affirmative obligation to "take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests . . ."
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This could easily cause a court to broadly construe the implied license.
The considerations that might lead a court to broadly construe the license are re-enforced further by the "Implied Grant of Collateral Rights" doctrine. 122 The doctrine requires a license to be interpreted broadly enough that its purpose can be achieved. 123 For example, the doctrine would give a licensee the right to distribute records that were made pursuant to a license to record them even where the original license was silent about distribution.
124
When the collateral rights doctrine is considered together with the rules of practice, it is likely that a court would make a broad interpretation of the nonexclusive license. Consequently, at a minimum, the license likely includes the right for the client to complete the document being prepared so that it can be used as intended. After all, the rules of practice express a strong preference in favor of the client's continued use of the work-product material; indeed, it would not be surprising if a court deemed the rules as part of the implied contract between the attorney and client. Beyond merely completing the document, because the basic relationship between the attorney and client calls for the attorney to represent the client in a particular matter, the collateral rights grant would seem to cover additional uses of the work-product within the same matter. 125 Of course, if the relationship between the attorney and client does not match the typical ones being discussed in this article, the results of the analysis would differ. If, for example, the attorney is hired only to write a particular document, rather than engage in a generalized representation of Vol. 3
As a consequence, the most probable outcome is that the client will be able to use the work-product throughout the conclusion of the matter for which the attorney was originally hired. This, of course, assumes that the attorney doesn't terminate the license, if he or she has that right. This requires an exploration of when licenses can be terminated.
(c) Terminating an Implied License
The final factor that can complicate the analysis of the effect of an implied license on an attorney's work-product is whether the license is terminable. Under copyright law, a license that is not supported by consideration from the licensee (client) is revocable. 126 Obviously, therefore, if the attorney has been fully compensated for developing the work-product, the implied license could not be terminated, leaving the client free to use it in accordance with the implied terms of the license. Where compensation has not been paid, as at-will employment does not constitute consideration, 127 and an attorney's employment by a client is at will by the rules of practice, 128 the nonexclusive license granted to the client to use the attorney's work-product would be revocable. the client, the client's argument for a broad license is weaker. An example of this would be where the lawyer directly representing the client hires another attorney to write a memorandum of law. 126 onsideration for a promise, by either the employee or the employer in an at-will employment, cannot be dependent on a period of continued employment. Such a promise would be illusory because it fails to bind the promisor who always retains the option of discontinuing employment in lieu of performance."). See generally 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 441 (1999) ("Contracts of employment, whose only consideration is the services to be performed thereunder and which are silent as to duration, are terminable at will . . ."). 128 See MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(a)(3) & id. cmt. 4 ("A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause . . .").
Where a license is revocable, the procedure the licensor (attorney) uses to terminate it is defined by state contract law. 129 This will generally empower the licensor to terminate it at will, although some states have begun to require a reasonable amount of notice to be provided before termination. 130 The ability of an attorney to terminate the nonexclusive license will differ depending on the contract law of the jurisdiction. If the state follows the more traditional rule that allows termination with minimal notice, the attorney could inform the client of the revocation which would then require the client to stop using the work-product immediately. If, on the other hand, as is much more probable, the state requires reasonable notice to terminate, 131 the client would maintain the right to continue using the work-product for at least some time, presumably the amount of time that it would take the client to replace it with a new one. In either case, though, the client's ability to continue using the work-product as a source Although state law controls the termination of a license in most circuits, the Copyright Act also provides an absolute right to terminate a license, generally after thirty-five years. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2000). As a practical matter, however, for an attorney's work-product, the value is likely to be absent after that long of a period. If a work-product license is terminated, therefore, it is likely to be under the provisions of state law. 130 See, e.g., 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 439 (1999) ("If there is nothing in the nature or the language of a contract for an indefinite period to indicate that it is perpetual, the courts will interpret the contract to be terminable at will . . . Some courts require, however, that such contracts be terminated only on reasonable notice."). 131 For the license between an attorney and client, it is likely that states would adopt this reasonable notice requirement because of the dictates contained within the rules of practice that an attorney take reasonable steps to protect the client when the employment relationship terminates. See MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d). Vol. 3 for newly developed ones-transforming a summary judgment memorandum into an appellate brief, for example 132 -would be terminated. When applied to the hypotheticals, only Henry King would have a right to terminate the nonexclusive license. In both the Brenda Maxim and David Smith hypotheticals, the attorneys were compensated, making the license irrevocable. Their clients, therefore, have a continuing right to use the works, only limited as discussed in the two proceeding subsections. Henry King, on the other hand, would have to do a work-product by work-product analysis to determine if he could terminate the nonexclusive license. If, for example, the work-product in question could not practically be replacedan executed contract or time-critical court document, for example-the client would maintain a right to use them. But where the document can be replaced, Henry's termination would be effective and the client's right to use the document would cease.
IV. THE COPYRIGHT DEFENSE OF FAIR USE
The analysis of copyright rights is never complete without examining the "fair use" defense. 133 Fair use constitutes an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim. 134 Unfortunately, an easy comprehension of the defense is 132 Again, here, it is important to remember the distinction that copyright law makes between the idea and the expression of it that comprise a work of authorship. See Section II, supra. The client, replacement counsel, or anyone else, for that matter, are free to examine the work-product and extract from it the ideas that underlie it. Thus, for example, the new attorney could use the original document as a source for the relevant cases and statutes that apply to the client's matter. Similarly, the legal theory under which the original counsel developed the case could be used without worries about copyright infringement. What is protected by copyright is how the original attorney expressed the legal theory, not the theory itself. 133 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 134 See id. § 106 ("Subject to sections 107 . . . , the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . .").
unlikely as it is both open-ended and imprecise. 135 The statute dictates that four specific factors "shall [be] include [d] " in the evaluation, 136 but the definition of "includ[e]" that is contained within the statute indicates these four factors are "illustrative and not limitative." 137 Consequently, although an analysis of the four statutory factors must always be done, there is nothing to stop a court from defining and applying some new fifth rule. 138 Unfortunately, the four primary considerations are not exercises in elucidative legislative drafting. 139 According to the Copyright Act, fair use is found based primarily on:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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Each of these statutory factors will be examined next, followed by a discussion of whether the courts are likely to Vol. 3 find a fifth factor outside of the statutory framework when examining work-products. After this discussion, they will be applied collectively to the hypothetical work-product documents.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use of the Work-Product
This "purpose of the use" statutory factor evaluates how the copyrighted work was used by the appropriator. 141 In effect, it evaluates whether there is a high enough societal gain achieved by the appropriation that requiring the author to forego his or her normal compensation is appropriate. Three types of uses are apropos to work-products:
Advancing the Public Interest
The statute specifies that uses "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research [are] not an infringement of copyright."
142 A work-product document being used in litigation would seem to at least touch on the sort of purpose that Congress indicated is more likely to be fair use. As with the categories expressly stated, litigation advances democracy, a core value to be preserved by appropriate application of the fair use defense as imprecisely described as "criticism, comment, [and] news reporting" in the statute. . 143 See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The scope of the fair use doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of public concern."); Sega Enters. Ltd.
Creating a Transformative Work
A highly determinative factor in evaluating the purpose of the use is whether the copying and use of the original work resulted in a new work that: In other words, the "copyrightable expression in the original work [must be] used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings . . ." 145 The closer the copy is to the original expression, the less likely it is to be fair use.
Using a Work Non-Commercially
A commercial use of another's copyrighted work raises a rebuttable presumption that the use is not fair.
146 "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price. 
B. Nature of the Work-Product
The "nature of the work" statutory factor requires consideration of the kind of work that was copied.
149 Two relevant aspects of work-products merit discussion:
Work Within Core of Copyright
The essence of this factor addresses whether the copyrighted work is considered within the "core" of works that obtain copyright protection. 150 The Supreme Court has indicated that "some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied." 151 The works that are at the core of copyright are those that required the most creativity in their creation or were generated in an expectation of returning a profit. 152 Consequently, works of fiction are less likely to support a finding of fair use that works of non-fiction 153 as are works that were expressed because of their inherent economic value. 154 
Unpublished Work
Another relevant consideration in evaluating the nature of the work is whether it is published. 155 When a work has not been published, a finding of fair use is much less likely.
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"Publication" is a term-of-art within copyright law. As the statute defines it, "'[p]ublication' is the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."
157 Very few workproducts meet this statutory definition.
C. Amount of the Work-Product Used
The "amount copied" statutory factor evaluates the quantity of the copyrighted work that is used in the new work.
158 "As a general matter, as the amount of the copyrighted material that is used increases, the likelihood that the use will constitute a 'fair use' decreases." 159 It is important to recognize, however, that there are no absolutes-copying all of an expression might be fair, 160 just as copying a small, but fundamental part of the expression might not be. 161 Consequently, both the quantity and the quality of what is copied must be evaluated.
D. Effect of Work-Product Copying on the Marketplace
The final "effect of copying" factor evaluates the impact that the type of copying done would have on the copyright Vol. 3 owner's overall market for the work. 162 This factor is, without doubt, the most important of the four statutory factors. 163 At the extreme, copying that destroys an author's ability to obtain reasonable value for the work is unfair.
As this analysis is done, it is necessary to have an appropriately broad perspective. As the Supreme Court held:
It requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original. The enquiry must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works. 164 In other words, the analysis requires that an assumption is made that all other people who are similarly situated with the appropriator-other attorneys, for the purpose of this paperare also copying the work in a similar way. It is the overall consequence this copying causes that forms the basis for the effect of copying factor analysis.
Additionally, Congress required two evaluations of the effects, one on "the potential market for" the copyrighted work and the other on the "value of" it. 165 Consequently, while the analysis must determine the economic impact on the copyright owner, it must also determine the other, noneconomic consequences of the copying. 166 An example of this can be found in Weissmann v. Freeman. 167 In the case, the defendant copied some of the plaintiff's academic work.
The court determined that the effect of copying factor did not favor a fair use finding despite the lack of economic impacts as the appropriation would "create[] a distinct disincentive for [the plaintiff] to continue to research and publish in the field of nuclear medicine" 169 The district court was expressly criticized for focusing on the "dollars received, rather than upon the realities of promotion and tenure in an academic setting."
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E. The Fifth Factor-Legal System Considerations
As discussed above, the four statutory factors are not exclusive and the courts can examine any other consideration that is relevant to determining whether the appropriation was fair.
171 When examining fair use in the context of a workproduct document, a probable fifth factor exists: the needs of the legal system itself. While, to a certain extent, the "public interest" aspect of the purpose of the use factor addresses similar considerations, the fact that an attorney's work is so central to the administration of justice magnifies the importance of the work to society, with a correspondingly higher probability of a fair use finding. The fair use defense, after all, has an important purpose of limiting an author's copyright rights when this is necessary to advance democracy.
172 Work-product documents, particularly those that are used within the judicial system, have this consequence. 173 Without the pleadings, briefs, and other work-products, it is unclear how a system of justice could function. 169 Id. 170 
F. Application to the Fair Use Hypotheticals
In this final part of the section, the fair use defense will be applied to the copying that occurred in the two relevant hypotheticals. This is necessary as a fair use analysis requires a case-by-case application of the facts to the law. 174 Thus, the Brenda Maxim hypothetical will be considered first and the David Smith hypothetical will follow. The third hypothetical involving Henry King will not be discussed in this section as it involves issues of implied licenses rather than fair use. The Brenda Maxim hypothetical shows copying by three separate appropriators: the court, the attorney in the second case, and the research system. Each will be discussed in turn.
(a) Court Copying of Her Expression
The court's use of Brenda's expression, even without attribution, is likely to be considered fair use. The analysis:
(1) Purpose of the Use This factor largely favors fair use. First, the judge's use of Brenda's expression was not commercial. Neither the judge nor the legal system receive compensation because of the unattributed quote. Second, the purposes of the quote serves to advance the public interest as definitions of the law in court opinions are critical to democracy in a common law country and they further serve the educational function of explaining the law. Slightly contradicting a fair use finding, on the other hand, is that the quote is not a transformative use of Brenda's work-product as the court opinion would closely match the brief. Overall, the first two positive considerations, particularly the public interest served, seem to outweigh the one negative, however. This factor favors fair use, therefore.
(2) Nature of the Work The nature of the work factor, too, generally favors fair use. As a work of non-fiction, a fair use finding is more likely established than it would be for a fictional one. 176 This finding is made even more probable by the law being the subject matter of the brief. On the other hand, the work is not a published work, at least as that term is defined in the Copyright Act. 177 An unpublished work is significantly less likely to support a fair use finding.
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In balancing these contradictory considerations, there are two reasons why the balance is likely to tip in favor of fair use. First, there is a significant chance that the courts would not use the statutory definition of publication for a fair use analysis as the work's distribution out of the control of the author seems more apropos to fair use analysis than the traditional copyright publication analysis. 179 Second, even though the work was not "published," it was distributed by the author into a forum that maintains public records. Both of these increase the probability that this factor favors fair use. Of the four statutory factors, this is the one that leans most strongly against a fair use finding. The most significant portion of the brief was the sections that defined both the Rule Against Perpetuities and ERISA and clarified their interrelationship. Copying the core of the brief disfavors a fair use finding.
(4) Effect of Copying on Brenda's Market
The court's use of the quote is unlikely to have a significant effect on Brenda's marketplace for her brief. First, there is no real economic market for briefs after their use in the case for which they were written. Although a submitted brief may sometimes be used in academia to study the subject briefed, 181 monetary compensation is not paid. Consequently, even if every judge quoted attorney's briefs without permission, there would be no economic impact on the attorney.
Although there is a slightly higher impact on the nonmonetary reward the attorney would receive-presumably the enhanced reputation an attorney would develop by having a judge publicly acknowledge the attorney's abilities by using an approved quotation written by the attorney-the injury does not stem from copyright rights but from the court's failure to attribute the quote to the attorney. This right of attribution, however, is not protected by the Copyright Act. 182 Additionally, although Brenda was not given credit for the quote itself, she would be listed as counsel of record, thus giving her much of the credit for the case.
Both the monetary and non-monetary analysis reach the same result: There is no significant impact on Brenda's market. This most important factor also favors fair use, therefore.
(5) The Fifth Factor-Legal System Considerations The probable fifth factor also strongly favors fair use. Brenda's brief was developed with the primary purpose of influencing a judge to render a favorable decision. This, of course, is how our common law system develops the law.
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Disallowing a judge to quote from a brief without the permission of the brief's author would seem to serve as a major impediment in the functioning of the legal system. Consequently, courts are much more likely to consider brief copying to be fair use.
(6) Conclusion Three of the four statutory factors favor a finding of fair use as do the extra-statutory considerations. It is probable, therefore, that a court would find that the judge's appropriation of Brenda's work-product was fair and, consequently, not a violation of the Copyright Act.
(b) Other Attorneys Copying Her Expression
The other attorney appropriating Brenda's expression without permission is less likely to be a fair use. This factor no longer favors fair use. First, unlike when the judge appropriated Brenda's work-product, the second attorney's use of it was commercial as the attorney was being paid for writing the second brief. 185 Second, the new brief was not significantly transformative as it was briefing the same legal issues in the same way. On the other hand, the use does serve a similar educational and law making purpose as before except that, of course, it is now being used to influence the development of the law rather than to announce it. With the educational role weakened and the commercialization increased, this factor now tips against fair use.
(2) Nature of the Work
The nature of the work factor's analysis is the same as when the judge appropriated Brenda's expression, 186 so it favors fair use.
(3) Amount Copied Again, the amount copied analysis is identical to the one of the court's use of Brenda's brief, 187 so the factor disfavors fair use.
(4) Effect on Brenda's Market
The effect of copying factor differs from the analysis of the court's use of the brief. If an attorney who feels compelled to copy another attorney's brief on a complicated issue is not allowed to do so, there is a significant chance that 185 Only if the second attorney was functioning purely as a pro bono counsel would this not be true. If the attorney received any benefitcredit towards promotion in a firm's pro bono program or a salary from an advocacy group, etc. -the purpose of the use will be tainted with commercialism. 186 See Section IV.F.1.a.(2), supra. 187 See Section IV.F.1.a.(3), supra.
more experienced counsel will be retained. 188 Of these consultations, some of them would likely be with attorneys in Brenda position. 189 As a consequence, this factor tips away from fair use. In the case of the second attorney copying Brenda's brief, three of the four factors weigh against a fair use finding. Particularly because the use is commercial without a countervailing transformation of the copied work, 191 a court is unlikely to determine that the defense has been established. Consequently, a violation of the Copyright Act most likely occurred.
(c) Research System Copying Her Expression
A fair use finding is least likely for the research system's copying of Brenda's brief. The analysis of most of the factors is the same as when the attorney copied the work, 192 but the purpose of the use factor now clearly suggests that the use is not fair. As research services are not free, their use of the brief becomes commercial. A commercial use is only fair where the other fair use factors overcome the author's normal 188 Cf. MODEL RULES 1.1, cmt. 2 ("Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question."). 189 entitlement to compensation. 193 This is most likely to be true where the appropriated work is highly transformed by the copier, 194 something that is not true in this hypothetical as an exact copy was made.
David Smith Hypothetical-Transactional WorkProducts 195
The fair use situation changes when non-litigation documents are analyzed. Overall, the probability of a fair use finding decreases.
(a) Purpose of the Use This first factor strongly indicates that Howard's copying of and modifications to David's contract were not fair. First, unlike a litigation work-product, no strong public interest is served by its subsequent use as contracts are not generally shared with the public at large and, consequently, serve no educational purpose. Second, although names and addresses may have been changed, the "copyrightable expression in the original work [was not] used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings," 196 meaning that no significant transformation occurred. Finally, the use of the contract by a competing attorney is a fundamentally commercial use.
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These three facts establish that the purpose of the use factor disfavors fair use.
(b) Nature of the Work As with a litigation work-product, a contract is a work of non-fiction, thus increasing the chances of a fair use finding.
In distinction with a litigation document, however, a contract is not distributed into a system that maintains public records. As a consequence, a contract represents a work that is neither published nor distributed which generally implies that a fair use finding is not appropriate. 198 Although it is possible that this statutory factor would be considered to be neutral, most courts would likely find that it disfavors a fair use finding.
(c) Amount Copied Again, as the entire contract was copied, this factor disfavors a fair use finding.
(d) Effect on David's Market
The market effect of copying such as Howard did in the hypothetical is likely to adversely affect David's financial and reputational markets. Howard, or any other attorney who is similarly situated, has avoided the necessity of either referring the matter to a more experience attorney who could draft the complicated contract or arranging to have a seasoned mentor assist in the drafting of it. Both of these impact on the more seasoned attorney's market.
(e) The Fifth Factor-Legal System Considerations Unlike a litigation document which has a direct connection to the public interest in the development of the law, transactional documents are associated with private orderings. A contract serves to establish the details of a legal relationship between its parties, but does not serve the broader purpose of educating the judge and public about the definition of the law. Consequently, there is no interest outside of the four statutory factors that is likely to cause a court to find fair use. Vol. 3 (f) Conclusion None of the factors in the statute favor a fair use finding. There is no outside consideration that would compel a court to develop a fifth factor. A finding of fair use, therefore, is extraordinarily unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
The determination of whether an attorney's legal rights have been violated by another's appropriation of a work product is not an easy analysis. Most times, the attorney will need to consider the competing equitable considerations of a copyright fair use analysis and may have to attempt to divine the terms of an agreement that were never expressed. Even after an analysis is done, the conclusion may be unclear and even contradictory.
As a practical matter, pursuing legal rights may be unwise outside of a direct appropriation by another attorney or a commercial enterprise. For other parties, an attorney would be wise to resolve the issue with due regard for the broader, public service considerations of the practice of law.
